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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH# 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
MICHELLE DAVIS PURSIFULL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860259-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a conviction of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, a 
third-degree felony, after a trial in the Third Judicial 
District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether Defendant's failure to make a single citation 
to the record in her brief should itself result in 
affirmance of the judgment below. 
2. Whether exigent circumstances justified the limited, 
warrantless search of Defendant's residence. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV provides as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Michelle Davis Pursifull, was charged with 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute for value, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (1986), on April 16, 1986 (R. 10-
11). 
Defendant made a motion to suppress evidence found 
during two searches of Defendant's residence, which was heard on 
August 4, 1986 (R. 211-25) and denied the same day in a 
memorandum decision (R. 19-21). Defendant's motion to suppress 
was renewed and again denied at trial (R. 491-96). Defendant was 
convicted of the crime charged in a jury trial held on August 26 
and 27, 1986, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings 
presiding (R. 226-577). Judge Billings sentenced Defendant on 
October 3, 1986, to serve not more than five years in the Utah 
State Prison. Judge Billings stayed execution of the prison 
sentence, placed Defendant on probation, and required Defendant 
to serve thirty days in the Salt Lake County Jail as a condition 
of probation (R. 80-81). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties verbally stipulated to the following facts 
at the hearing on Defendants motion to suppress: On April 14, 
1986, at 7:43 a.m., police officers received notice of a shooting 
at Defendants residence (R. 213-14). There they found 
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Defendants boyfriend lying in the driveway and being treated by 
emergency medical technicians for a fatal gunshot wound (R. 214). 
One of the officers questioned Defendant about what had happened, 
and other officers conducted a warrantless, victim-or-suspect 
search to secure the premises. Defendant told the officer that 
her boyfriend had answered a knock at the door that morning and 
had been shot in the chest by an assailant, whom he chased before 
returning to the apartment and asking Defendant to call an 
ambulance (R. 214). 
During the course of the victim-or-suspect search, an 
officer observed what appeared to be three bales of marijuana in 
a linen closet1 next to the master bedroom.2 Based upon this 
information, the Narcotics Division obtained a search warrant, 
thoroughly searched the premises, and seized the bales of 
marijuana as well as "numerous other drugs and drug 
paraphernalia11 which Defendant contends should have been 
suppressed (R. 216).3 
1The closet was full size (R. 221), and the parties 
stipulated that "the closet door was the same size and type of 
any closet door . . . in a home" (R. 224). See State's Exhibit 
1-S, a photograph of the open closet (R. 249) (Appendix A). 
2Testimony at trial established that the officer opened the 
door of the closet, smelled marijuana, and discovered three 
large, white garbage bags, the contents of which could not be 
seen, except for the top one, which was open to reveal "a leafy 
substance which appear[ed] to be marijuana" (R. 248-250). See 
State's Exhibit 1-S (Appendix A). 
3According to testimony at trial, the search of Defendant's 
residence revealed a total of 55 pounds of marijuana in different 
locations (R. 266-69, 275-77) with a street value of $88,000 (R. 
278-29, 337). The search also yielded a balance scale suitable 
for measuring amounts of marijuana, which was found in the master 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Since Defendant has failed to refer to any portion of 
the record that factually supports her contentions on appeal, 
this Court should assume the correctness of the judgment below. 
Police officers in this case were well within Mincey 
guidelines in conducting a warrantless, victim-or-suspect search 
of Defendants residence and in obtaining a search warrant on the 
basis of evidence which was in plain view in the course of that 
search. Defendant's consent to the search and any account she 
may have given officers of the shooting incident are irrelevant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ABSENT CITATION TO THE RECORD TO SUPPORT 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR, THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Defendant makes not a single citation to the record in 
her entire brief.4 Her argument is based partly on the account 
she allegedly gave police officers of the shooting incident, but 
bedroom along with Defendant's clothing and belongings (R. 263-
66, 483-84), and a tray containing marijuana residue, probably 
used in packaging, from the kitchen (R. 277, 335). A room in the 
basement "appeared to be used solely for the packaging of 
marijuana" (R. 338). It contained a table with a special, 
pointed shape ideal for marijuana packaging (R. 293, 338), a 
large amount of marijuana residue on the table and floor (R. 338, 
363), another balance scale (R. 278, 365), and two boxes of "zip 
lock type sandwich bags" (R. 278, 363). Two garbage bags filled 
with cut marijuana stems, seeds, and other scraps and residue 
were found outside the packaging room (R. 341-42, 364-65). 
The evidence in controversy was identified at R. 264-78 
and offered and received at R. 314-15, 372-73. 
4Defendant did not cite to the trial transcript in writing 
her brief because she failed to have it prepared, instead leaving 
the State with the burden of doing so. However, Defendant failed 
to cite even to the hearing transcript of her motion to suppress 
and the various documents which were available to her. 
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there is no citation to this account. Portions of the facts as 
stated by Defendant are not only without reference to the record 
but entirely outside it as far as the State can discern.5 
In State v. Tucker. 657 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that 
[a] separate and independent basis for the 
affirmance of the trial court is that the 
defendant failed to refer to any portion of 
the record that factually supports his 
contentions on appeal. This Court will 
assume the correctness of the judgment below 
5The following facts as stated in Defendant's brief are 
nowhere to be found in the record: 
The media arrived at approximately 8:30 
a.m. and questioned the policeman in charge. 
The media left, and one of them returned at 
approximately 9:00 a.m. He stated, "I got 
down to the station, and they asked if I got 
pictures of them bringing marijuana out of 
the house." The sheriff said, "no comment." 
While the appellant's sister was talking 
to the policemen, one of them said Mr. Bakker 
had been involved with the police and drugs 
for years, and that they had found 3 bales of 
marijuana in the "basement." She asked why 
they were not taking that outside the house 
as they had the other marijuana. The 
policeman said they were waiting for a search 
warrant to arrive at the scene. 
Brief of Appellant at 3. Although Defendant's sister gave 
uncorroborated testimony that police officers removed a garbage 
bag and guns from Defendant's home before obtaining a search 
warrant (R. 469-70, 479-81), there is no support in the record 
for Defendant's statement that "[t]he police did not leave an 
inventory list with the appellant, nor at the residence." Id. 
In fact, Defendant's sister testified that "they . . . handed us 
the search warrant, what they had found, where they had found it" 
(R. 470). Further, almost all of Defendant's description of what 
happened between the assailant's knock on Defendant's door and 
the arrival of the police, id, at 2, although mostly stated by 
defense counsel at the motion-to-suppress hearing (R. 216-17), 
was neither stipulated to by the State nor supported by testimony 
at trial. Thus, Defendant has submitted to this Court a 
statement of facts scarcely supported by and never cited to the 
record. 
- 5 -
if counsel on appeal does not . . . mak[e] a 
concise statement of facts and citation of 
the pages in the record where they are 
supported. 
Similarly, in State v. Olmos. 712 P.2d 287, 287 (Utah 1986), the 
court noted that " [t]he record in this case is sparse, and 
defendant has failed to refer to pages of the record in support 
of his points on appeal. These deficiencies will normally 
require us to assume regularity in the proceedings and 
correctness in the judgment appealed from." According to this 
standard, this Court should not reach the merits of Defendant's 
case. 
II. THE LIMITED, WARRANTLESS SEARCH CONDUCTED IN 
THIS CASE FALLS WELL WITHIN THE EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT. 
The sole, substantive issue presented on this appeal is 
whether police officers were justified under Mincey v. Arizona, 
437 U.S. 385 (1978), which the State acknowledges is 
controlling,6 in making a warrantless search of Defendant's 
^Defendant relies solely upon the fourth amendment to the 
federal Constitution to support her claim. In such instances, 
the Utah Supreme Court has declared it will treat the case solely 
under that amendment and not on state constitutional grounds. 
State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986); State v. Dorsev, 
731 P.2d 1085, 1091 n.l (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); 
State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d 200, 205 n.3 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Johnson. 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 33 (1987) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring); and State v. Egbert. 66 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 55 n.l 
(1987) (Durham, J., dissenting). 
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residence to see if there were other victims or if a killer was 
still on the premises.7 The Mincey standard is as follows: 
We do not question the right of the police to 
respond to emergency situations. Numerous 
state and federal cases have recognized that 
the Fourth Amendment does not bar police 
officers from making warrantless entries and 
searches when they reasonably believe that a 
person within is in need of immediate aid. 
Similarly, when the police come upon the 
scene of a homicide they may make a prompt 
warrantless search of the area to see if 
there are other victims or if a killer is 
still on the premises. Cf. Michigan v. 
Tyler, supra. [436 U.S. 499] at 509-510. 
•The need to protect or preserve life or 
avoid serious injury is justification for 
what would be otherwise illegal absent an 
exigency or emergency.• Wayne v. United 
States. 115 U.S. App. D.C. 234, 241, 318 F.2d 
205, 212 (opinion of Burger, J.). And the 
police may seize any evidence that is in 
plain view during the course of their 
legitimate emergency activities. Michigan v. 
Tyler, supra, at 509-510; Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. [443], at 465-466. 
Id. at 392 (footnotes omitted). Applying the standard to the 
facts in Mincey. the Court added, 
But a warrantless search must be 
'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies 
which justify its initiation,• Terry v. 
Ohio. 392 U.S. [1], at 25-26, and it simply 
cannot be contended that this search was 
justified by any emergency threatening life 
or limb. All the persons in Mincey1 s 
apartment had been located before the 
7The actual conduct of the search is not an issue. 
Defendant contends only that the warrantless search inside her 
residence should not have occurred at all. She makes no claim 
on appeal that had a limited search under the exigent 
circumstances exception been proper, opening the linen closet 
door exceeded the limit. Indeed, whatever the exact size of the 
closet door, it was certainly large enough to justify a 
reasonable belief that the closet could conceal a victim or 
suspect (R. 221, 224, 492, 494, 496, State's Exhibit 1-S). 
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investigating homicide officers arrived there 
and began their search. And a four-day 
search that included opening dresser drawers 
and ripping up carpets can hardly be 
rationalized in terms of the legitimate 
concerns that justify an emergency search. 
Id. at 393. 
Defendant contends that the warrantless search of her 
residence was similarly unjustified. The facts of this case, 
however, stand in sharp contrast to those in Mincey and 
demonstrate a model balance between the right of the people to be 
secure against "unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S. Const, 
amend. IV, and the "right of the police to respond to emergency 
situations.11 Mincey at 392. The balance is best expressed by 
the Mincey Court's statement that "warrants are generally 
required to search a person's home or his person unless 'the 
exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so 
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 393 (emphasis added). 
In Mincey. the Court expressed no disapproval of the 
initial victim-or-suspect search conducted by narcotics agents, 
which revealed "a young woman wounded in the bedroom closet and 
Mincey apparently unconscious in the bedroomf as well as Mincey's 
three acquaintances (one of whom had been wounded in the head) in 
the living room." Jd. at 388. Only the search conducted by 
homicide detectives who arrived after the scene had been secured 
was held unconstitutional. This search 
lasted four days, during which period the 
entire apartment was searched, photographed, 
and diagrammed. The officers opened drawers, 
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closets, and cupboards, and inspected their 
contents; they emptied clothing pockets; they 
dug bullet fragments out of the walls and 
floors; they pulled up sections of the carpet 
and removed them for examination. Every item 
in the apartment was closely examined and 
inventoried, and 200 to 300 objects were 
seized. In short, Mincey's apartment was 
subjected to an exhaustive and intrusive 
search. No warrant was ever obtained. 
Id. at 389 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In this case, as 
supported by the record in the Statement of Facts, supra, a 
limited, victim-or-suspect search of a homicide scene revealed a 
controlled substance in plain view in an area where a victim or 
suspect might reasonably be found. This search was "strictly 
circumscribed by the exigencies with justif[ied] its initiation," 
id. at 393, however, and went no further than an attempt to 
locate persons injured or hiding on the premises. A search 
warrant was duly obtained before a more extensive search was 
conducted. Thus, the officers in this case conducted themselves 
in a manner consistent with good police work, the Mincey 
standard, and the Fourth Amendment. 
Defendant contends, however, that she did not consent 
to the victim-or-suspect search and cites several cases holding 
that a call for emergency assistance does not constitute 
unlimited consent to all manner of intrusive searches. The 
searches in all of these cases, however, went beyond the scope of 
a limited, victim-or-suspect search so that consent was necessary 
9 -
to justify them.8 In this case, Defendants consent is 
irrelevant. The officers could lawfully have made the victim-or-
suspect search of Defendants residence even if she had 
expressly forbidden it, since this type of search is justified by 
the exigencies of the situation, not by consent. Id. at 392. 
Defendant further contends, however, that the officers 
"[knew] as fact there was simply one victim . . . and [knew] as 
fact the killer had never entered the house; and [knew] as fact 
that the killer had fled the premises following the shooting." 
Brief of Appellant at 8. In addition to having allegedly been 
informed of these facts upon their arrival, id. at 6, Defendant 
asserts that "[t]he police were also in a position to observe 
that a trail of blood led to the doorway of the house in 
question, and allowed them to conclude not only that the deceased 
had been shot in that doorway, but had subsequently staggered out 
to the driveway." Id. at 10. Defendant argues that a victim-or-
suspect search was therefore unjustified. Defendant's 
characterization of the circumstances, however, is unsupported by 
BIn State v. Jolley. 68 N.C. App. 33, 314 S.E.2d 134 (1984), 
rev'd, 312 N.C. 296, 321 S.E.2d 883 (1984), cert, denied, 470 
U.S. 1051 (1985), the defendant had shot her husband and both had 
been removed from the scene before a detective arrived and 
conducted a six-hour search of the defendant's home. In People 
v. Annerino, 97 111. App. 3d 240, 422 N.E.2d 923 (1981), the 
premises had been already been secured when police officers 
searched in a crawl space underneath the defendant's kitchen in 
order to retrieve a bullet. In State v. Young. 135 Ariz. 437, 
661 P.2d 1138 (Ct. App. 1982), cert, denied. 464 U.S. 866 (1983), 
a police officer searched the dropped ceiling of a bar an hour 
after the scene had been secured. 
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the record and assumes too much, and her argument fails to 
consider relevant factors. 
The only account of what Defendant told police 
officers when they arrived at the scene is found in the 
stipulated facts at the hearing on Defendant's motion to 
suppress. No additional evidence on the subject was adduced at 
trial. The stipulation was that the officer who spoke with 
Defendant "discovered from her that that morning that her 
boyfriend with whom she was living with her child . . . had 
received a knock at the door. The boyfriend had responded to the 
knock, there was heard a thud. The boyfriend left the apartment, 
chased after an assailant who had shot him in the chest, returned 
to the apartment, and loudly and insistently cried out he had 
been shot and asked for an ambulance to be called" (R. 214). 
There are in this account two possible sources of confusion for 
police officers: First, Defendant apparently told the officer 
that her child also lived at the residence, but the record does 
not show whether the child was present on the morning in 
question. If not, and if Defendant explained this absence, the 
record does not show it. Thus, the child would be another 
potential victim in the officer's mind. Second, the trial 
transcript reveals some uncertainty about the number of 
assailants. Counsel for Defendant stated that "the neighbors 
that they interviewed and the defendant, maybe the sister, but 
anyone said that they—a guy had run away. One of the witnesses, 
I think, would have testified two guys ran away, but the bulk of 
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it is, a guy ran away." (R. 494). Thus, the exact status of the 
two objects of a victim-or-suspect search was far more doubtful 
than Defendant contends. 
If police officers were to evaluate at length the story 
of witnesses and the evidence at the scene in order to decide if 
a victim-or-suspect search were warranted, the very purposes of 
such a search in immediately aiding victims, preventing the 
escape of suspects, and protecting the officers would be 
frustrated. This type of search must not be made to wait upon 
witness interviews and evidence evaluation. As in this case, 
different officers may be assigned to simultaneously interview 
witnesses and conduct a preliminary, victim-or-suspect search. 
The officers first arriving have neither time nor extensive, 
specialized training to play the part of detectives and analyze 
the subtle implications of evidence before acting to secure the 
scene. And witnesses, who may also be possible suspects, may be 
distraught, even hysterical, mistaken, or lying. Therefore, 
officers should not debate and decide based on evidence analysis 
or the account of witnesses whether to conduct a victim-or-
suspect search, but should automatically conduct such a search 
upon arriving at the scene of a violent crime. This is the 
course followed by the officers in this case. 
This view is supported by the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 
(1984). In that case, police officers were called to a homicide 
scene by the killerfs daughter, who informed the officers that 
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the killer had shot her husband and then ingested pills in a 
suicide attempt before changing her mind and calling her daughter 
for help. The killers daughter directed deputies to the two 
bedrooms containing the killer and the victim. Nevertheless, the 
deputies then searched the premises for other victims or 
suspects. Homicide investigators then arrived and conducted a 
two-hour "general exploratory search for evidence of a crime.1' 
Id. at 18. The Court disapproved only the second warrantless 
search, noting that "the evidence at issue here was not . . . 
discovered during the 'victim-or-suspect' search that had been 
completed by the time the homicide investigators arrived." Id. 
at 22. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the 
particular circumstances must be judged against the following 
objective standard: "[W]ould the facts available to the officer 
at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 
appropriate?" Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Based upon 
the foregoing arguments, the answer to this question in this case 
is yes. Therefore, the limited, warrantless, victim-or-suspect 
search of Defendant's residence was constitutionally permissible, 
and evidence which it revealed, or to which it led by forming the 




Based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g arguments , t h e S t a t e 
r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t s t h i s Court t o a f f i r m Defendant ' s 
c o n v i c t i o n . 
DATED t h i s P^-tfl day of October, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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STATE'S EXHIBIT 1-S 
